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ADRIENNE HUNTER JULES* AND FERNANDA G. NICOLA**
The Contractualization of Family Law in the
United Statest
Topic II. A
This article is the word-restricted response of the authors as the
U.S. national reporter to an expansive request of the International
Academy of Comparative Law (IACL) issued to the reporters of
twenty-one different member nations.' As any U.S. report on family
law requires discussion of the varied laws of the fifty U.S. states, our
report necessarily contains a vast summary component with broad
generalizations in order to provide the requested context for U.S. law.
The authors also explore larger themes and scholarship in order to
illustrate some of the important developments and theories advanced
by U.S. lawyers and scholars in the areas discussed.
I. BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. FAMILY LAW
A. Family Law as a State Prerogative
The legal system of the United States is a system of separation of
powers, "both vertically (along the axis of federal, state and local au-
thority) and horizontally (along the axis of legislative, executive, and
** Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, JD Turin
Law School, PhD Trento University, SJD Harvard Law School. The authors would
like to thank Martha Ertman, Nancy Polikoff, Ann Shalleck, and Macarena Saez for
their comments and expertise, and Chelsea Rubin and Nicole Anouk Leger for their
stellar research assistance and editorial help.
t DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2013.0022
1. In summary, the IACL requested, inter alia, that the authors, within 10,000
words, situate family law within the U.S. legal system; describe the applicability of
international instruments in U.S. family law; describe any general boundaries of con-
tractual freedom in family law; describe the types of intimate partnerships legally
recognized by U.S. law, the legal conditions of formation and dissolution and whether
it is possible contractually to opt in or opt out of these default rules (horizontal family
law); describe the parent-child relationship, if and how one might establish legal
parenthood contractually, e.g. through artificial insemination (vertical family law);
describe whether legal parents may contract with civil effect in regard to a host of
decisions regarding children, particularly upon divorce or separation; describe which
ADR-techniques apply in family law matters and how they apply; describe whether or
not family law agreements need judicial approval and which conditions and standard
ofjudicial review apply; and, describe the standard ofjudicial review, if any, in regard
to modifying a family law agreement.
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judicial authority)."2 Substantive family law, as understood in its
narrow sense as the laws governing the entrance and exit from mar-
riage and all related ancillary issues, e.g. marital property division,
spousal support, child custody, child support, is a state prerogative. 3
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution generally secures
this authority for the states.4 Adhering to a common law system
within this framework of federalism, the states adopt statutes and
procedural rules governing these areas of family law, as narrowly de-
fined, and the highest state courts interpret and apply the resulting
rules and regulations, issuing binding decisions that have preceden-
tial value upon lower state courts and in effect become the
substantive family law.
B. Federal Family Law
The fact that the states exercise authority over family law gener-
ally does not mean that federal law has no role in governing the
family.5 As just one example, there exist over a thousand federal laws
in which "federal rights and benefits are conditioned upon marital or
spousal status."6 In the area of child support, the federal government
takes an instructive role, through federal legislation requiring states
to identify parents and create state child support guidelines.7 Fur-
ther, efforts of the Uniform Law Commission to create uniform laws
among the states have resulted in various draft legislation, some of
which the states have adopted.
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued opinions on family law is-
sues, addressing topics such as abortion, termination of parental
rights, and state criminalization of sexual conduct.8 These decisions,
the authors argue, deal generally with an individual's right to pri-
vacy, an individual's right to make decisions regarding the most
intimate aspects of her life, free from intrusion by the government or
2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (3d ed. 2000).
3. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013); Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2004); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987).
4. Lavine v. Cincent, 401 U.S. 531 (1971).
5. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q.
529, 539 (2008); See also, Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the
Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 383 (2007); Libby S. Adler, Federalism
and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197 (1999).
6. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (2013).
7. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (conditioning federal funding for state wel-
fare programs on implementation of state programs to establish paternity and enforce
child support payments); Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2345
(1988) (conditioning federal funding for child support enforcement on state establish-
ment of presumptive child support guidelines.)
8. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
758-759 (1982); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2005); see also Linda D. Elrod, The
Federalization of Family Law, 36 HUM. RTS. 6 (2009).
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others, a right generally carved out of the guarantees of the U.S. Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights. 9
The Supreme Court recently considered same-sex marriage. In
U.S. v. Windsor, the Court declared key provisions of the federal De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional. DOMA, enacted by
the U.S. Congress in 1996, before any state had legalized same-sex
marriage, prevented federal recognition of any same-sex marriage
lawfully granted by any U.S. state. 10 By the time of this writing, thir-
teen of the fifty U.S. states permit same-sex marriage.
The authors assert that U.S. v. Windsor presents evolving U.S.
jurisprudence, extending beyond the right to privacy, that people ac-
quire a constitutionally protected public dignity and status through
marriage, as do their children," that the government cannot dimin-
ish by refusing legal recognition.' 2 Logically following Loving v.
Virginia,'3 which commands legal recognition of interracial mar-
riages, this jurisprudence should lead to the conclusion that no state
can refuse legal recognition of valid out-of-state same-sex marriages,
and, eventually, should invalidate state laws denying marriage li-
censes for same-sex marriages.' 4 These latter two developments have
not yet occurred, but are surely on the horizon.
9. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161-62 (2004).
10. The U.S. Supreme Court this year also considered Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133
S. Ct. 2652 (2013) held that proponents of a state law banning same-sex marriage
(Proposition 8) lacked standing to appeal a lower federal court decision that the law
was unconstitutional. Although there was no substantive discussion of same-sex mar-
riage, Hollingsworth effectively means that Proposition 8 is gone. Without Proposition
8, California officials are free to resume issuing marriage licenses for same sex
couples, and these marriages will have full status and recognition under the laws of
the state of California.
11. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 ("And [DOMA] humiliates tens of thousands of
children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even
more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily
lives."). Macarena Saez, immediately following the issuance of the decision, com-
mented on the prevalent use of the word "dignity" in the decision and the ways in
which this prevalence perhaps represents both a transplant from foreign jurispru-
dence but also a newer "American" understanding of a dignity-conferring institution
of marriage, oral comments at a forum following the decision, American University,
Washington College of Law (June 27, 2013); see also Melissa Murray, What's So New
About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, Soc. POL'Y & LAW 387, 417 (2012)
(decrying the reappearance of previously denounced illegitimacy as the new rationale
for striking down same-sex marriage prohibitions which purportedly harm children of
same-sex couples by making it impossible for their parents to be married).
12. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 ("DOMA undermines both the public and private
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, and all
the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.").
13. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 384 (1978) ("The right to marry is of fundamental importance for all
individuals.").
14. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (foreshadowing this
development); See also Jeffrey Toobin, Adieu, DOMA!, THE NEW YORKER (July 8,
2013) http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2013/07/08/130708taco-talk-toobin.
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C. International Family Law
International law also affects U.S. family law in disputes impli-
cating specific international conventions to which the U.S. is a
signatory.' 5 For example, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction provides procedures for the return
of children unlawfully removed from or retained outside of the coun-
try of their habitual residence. 16 The Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption regulates international adoption.' 7 These Conventions re-
spectively provide procedures for the return of children unlawfully
removed from or retained outside the state of their habitual residence
and regulate international adoption.' Even though these conven-
tions are important human rights instruments, they have spurred
criticism among U.S. scholars.' 9 These scholars have disputed the
goals and implementation of the Convention on Adoption, some argu-
ing that it should be less burdensome and encourage international
adoption, 20 others arguing that international adoption abuses such
as child-buying and coercion abound, and strict regulation is neces-
sary and desirable in order to protect vulnerable birth parents. 2 '
Finally, prominent Human Rights norms advanced by regional
courts such as the European Court of Human Rights interpreting Ar-
ticle 8 of the ECHR famously influenced the U.S. Supreme Court
15. See D. KELLY WEISBURG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW
857 (5th ed. 2013). See generally Anne Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The
Hague Children's Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the
United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 80-84 (2010); Barbara Stark, The Internationaliza-
tion of American Family Law, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 467, 469 (2012);
Merle H. Weiner, Codification, Cooperation, and Concern for Children: The Interna-
tionalization of Family Law in the United States Over the Last Fifty Years, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 619, 635-37 (2008). With respect to International Human Rights instruments
affecting family law, women and children, the U.S. has failed to ratify some signifi-
cant human rights instruments, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, and the Convention on the Rights on the Child, opened for signature on
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
16. Implemented in the U.S. through the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610, and 22 C.F.R. §§ 94.1-94.8 (2013). See Linda
D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, Review of the Year in Family Law 2011-2012: "DOMA"
Challenges Hit Federal Courts and Abduction Cases Increase, 46 FAM. L.Q. 471
(2013).
17. Implemented in the U.S. through the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000
(IAA), 42 U.S.C. § 14901 (2000). See Elrod & Spector, supra note 16.
18. See Estin, supra note 15, at 80-84 (quoting Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The
Hague Draft Convention on International Child Abduction, 14 FAM. L.Q. 99, 101-03
(1980)); see also WEISBURG & APPLETON, supra note 15, at 857.
19. See Barbara Stark, When Globalization Hits Home: International Family Law
Comes of Age, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1551, 1600 (2006).
20. See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human
Rights Issue, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 115, 165 (2007).
21. See KATHRYN JOYCE, THE CHILD CATCHERS (2013); Johanna Oreskovic & Trish
Maskew, Red Thread or Slender Reed: Deconstructing Prof Bartholet's Mythology of
International Adoption, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 128 (2008).
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decision in Lawrence v. Texas.22 The Inter-American Human Rights
system originating out of the Organization of American States is
gaining momentum among LGBT groups for interpreting the con-
tours of sexual discrimination and gender equality.23 The Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights condemned the United
States in the case Jessica Lehahan, finding that through police non-
intervention in a domestic violence case, the U.S .failed to exercise its
good faith duty to enforce antidiscrimination provisions for the pro-
tection of women. 24
II. CONTRACTING HORIZONTAL INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
In accordance with the framework set forth in the IACL request,
this article first addresses horizontal intimate relationship con-
tracting and then vertical intimate relationship contracting. This
article then discusses the contract method of alternative dispute reso-
lution and provides some final words on contracting permanence
within family law.
A. Marriage as Contract?
Contracting horizontal intimate relationships concerns marriage
and its alternatives, a discussion about which, the authors believe,
requires discussion of the changing relationship of marriage to con-
tract, within the U.S. Not always worthy of its occasional appellation,
the so-called "marriage contract" is qualitatively different from a
standard contract. 25 Janet Halley traces the beginnings of U.S. treat-
ment of marriage as a contract to the early nineteenth century;
Halley then notices a profound shift in the mid-nineteenth century,
when contemporary thinkers began to conceive of marriage as more
of a status than a contract. 26 This transformation corresponded with
the rise of free market laissez faire ideology and actually pitted fam-
22. 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
23. See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Decisions and Judgments, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012); Rosa M. Celorio, The Case of Karen Atala
and Daughters: Toward a Better Understanding of Discrimination, Equality, and the
Rights of Women, 15 CUNY L. REV. 335, 354 (2012).
24. See Jessica Lenahan v. United States (Gonzales), Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11 (2011).
25. While mutual asset seems always to have been a requirement in Western
marriages, the reasons why people marry have changed over time, people now expect-
ing personal fulfillment instead of or in addition to other goals such as property
control or political advantage. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM
OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY; OR How LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 24-31 (2005); see also
ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-Go-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE
FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 87-115 (2009); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 56-58
(2011).
26. Janet Halley, What is Family Law: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 2 (2011).
2014]
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ily relationships against contractual relationships within the market:
"the husband, wife, and child constituted 'the family' and lived in an
affective, sentimental, altruistic, ascriptive, and morally saturated
legal and social space. The market was the family's opposite: rational,
individualistic, free, and morally neutral."27 Many regard Maynard v.
Hill (1888) as the seminal U.S. case establishing marriage as more
than a mere contract, as also a status, properly regulated by the
government. 2
8
And so it is today, marriage based on the free assent of the par-
ties immediately subjects the parties to legal rights and obligations,
often without their full knowledge or consent. Further, states set the
terms under which the parties may abandon the marriage. In this
manner, we may describe U.S. marriage more appropriately as an
institution of public status with accompanying rights and obligations
created by the public will versus a form of private contract. Neverthe-
less, the view of marriage as more status than contract is an ongoing,
fluid debate, many arguing that contract is more important in defin-
ing this relationship and the behavior of individuals within it.
Notably, Martha Ertman emphasizes the view that marriage is and
long has been a mix of status and contract, in varying proportions
over time, with status not necessarily winning, in the past or
present.
29
B. Contracting In and Out of Marriage Default Rules
The use of civil contracts to govern horizontal relationships be-
tween intimate partners represents an effort by private individuals
to circumvent the underlying default laws of marriage. We see this
form of contractualization of family law in the distinct scenarios de-
scribed below.
C. No Marriage and No Contract
As it was necessary first to reflect briefly on the relationship of
marriage to contract, it is now appropriate that we take another
break in the discussion to make clear who we are talking about and
who we are not talking about, when we discuss marriage and contrac-
tual circumvention of marriage law. Increasingly, more U.S. citizens
are spending more of their adult lives outside of a marriage, whether
or not they have children. 30 There are important class and racial dis-
27. Id. at 3.
28. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
29. See Martha Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 66-68
(1998) [hereinafter Ertman, Commercializing Marriage]; Martha Ertman, Marriage
as a Trade, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 92-98 (2001) [hereinafter Ertman, Mar-
riage as a Trade].
30. See Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise, For Women Under 30, Most Births
Occur Outside Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at Al; see Sabrina Tavernise,
[Vol. 62
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tinctions in this overall trend. Generally speaking, the class qualities
of greater education and higher income predict higher levels of mar-
riage. 3 1 As a striking racial distinction, African-Americans, in
particular, after correcting for education and income, spend fewer of
their adult years in marriage. 32
Generally speaking, those persons in non-marital intimate rela-
tionships have legal obligations to one another that are no different
than between strangers. There are exceptions to be sure. As the most
prominent, striking exception, Washington State currently allows
non-married cohabitating partners participation in the state's com-
munity property regime, so that non-married, cohabitating partners
may request division of assets acquired during their cohabitation
upon dissolution of their relationship.3 3 More generally, across more
states, domestic violence statutes in many jurisdictions impose obli-
gations and bestow rights upon persons in intimate relationships,
irrespective of their marital status. Certain jurisdictions also trans-
mute the status of cohabitating persons into the status of married
persons, through common-law marriage. Some private organizations
and companies also have made available benefits, such as health and
retirement benefits, to the non-married domestic partners of their
members and employees.
Further, certain state legislatures have created new categories of
legally recognized horizontal relationships that these states statuto-
rily deem virtually equal or very similar to the relationship of
marriage, i.e. civil unions and domestic partnerships. There is reason
to believe these legislative developments have been efforts of inclu-
sion for same-sex couples who cannot marry under the laws of those
states. Accordingly, as those state laws change, and same-sex couples
gain the right to marry, these newer legally recognized categories for
unmarried intimate partners might cease to exist.34
Further, the legal effect of the Marvin decision, discussed below,
has been the creation of equitable theories of recovery for individuals
who split after years cohabitating without marriage to recover some
division of the assets acquired by each other during their time to-
gether or some ongoing monetary support after they part ways. These
Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011,
at A22.
31. See CHERLIN, supra note 25, at 114-15.
32. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE: HOW THE AFRI-
CAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011); see also Ralph Richard
Banks and Su Jin Gatlin, African American Intimacy: The Racial Gap in Marriage, 11
MICH. J. RACE & L. 115, 122 (2005).
33. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 332 (Wash. 1984); Connell v. Fran-
cisco, 898 P.2d 831, 837 (Wash. 1995).
34. See, e.g., Michael Dresser & Carrie Wells, With Same-sex Marriage Now
Available, State to End Benefits for Domestic Partners, BALT. SUN (May 3, 2013),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-03/features/bs-md-domestic-benefits-201305
02 1 domestic-partners-health-benefits-state-employees#.Uk3RAqPdmsk.email.
2014]
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theories include theories of implied contracts, joint venture, construc-
tive trust or resulting trust, and have been adopted by some but not
all U.S. courts. 35 These theories, where accepted, allow parties to
avoid marriage and the technical requirements of contract execution
and still receive some of the dissolution rights associated with
marriage. 36
Not all states have been eager to expand dissolution rights to
cohabiting intimate partners who neither marry nor contract for mar-
riage-like benefits. A few states reject the theories described above as
disingenuous attempts to create contracts where none really exist in
order to avoid their state laws prohibiting the recognition of common
law marriages. 37 Some states require an express contract, whether
oral or written;38 others require an actual written contract.39
Getting back to the subject of our inquiry regarding the contrac-
tualization of family law, do we consider those persons in intimate
horizontal relationships outside of marriage who do not execute con-
tracts to govern their relationships to be privately ordering their
family lives? What if the laws of their states might grant them some
equitable relief when they split?
To be sure, horizontal intimate relationships outside of marriage
and contract are not necessarily completely without some form of in-
formal private ordering. As just one example, in her work on low-
income single mothers, Katherine Edin explores the ways in which
35. See, e.g., Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 121, 128 (Md. App. 1982) (oral agree-
ment); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Neb. 1981) (oral agreement); Knauer v.
Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 566 (Pa. Super. 1983) (oral agreement); Carroll v. Lee, 712
P.2d 923 (Ariz. 1986) (implied agreement); Kaiser v. Strong, 735 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ill.
App. 2000) (constructive trust); Akers v. Stamper, 410 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1966)
(joint venture). See generally ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, WORK OF
THE FAMILY LAWYER 707-08 (3d ed. 2012).
36. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS § 6.03 (2002). Having abandoned the contract approach to resolving
cohabitation disputes, the ALI recommends the presumption of a legally cognizable
domestic partnership, akin to marriage in rights upon dissolution, after three years of
cohabitation.
37. See e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Ill. 1979) ("It is said that
because there are so many unmarried cohabitants today courts must confer a legal
status on such relationships. This, of course, is the rationale underlying some of the
decisions and commentaries . . . If this is to be the result, however, it would seem
more candid to acknowledge the return of varying forms of common law marriage
than to continue displaying the naivete we believe involved in the assertion that there
are involved in these relationships contracts ... '); see also Devaney v. L'Esperance,
949 A.2d 743, 754 (N.J. 2008) (Rivera-Soto, J., concurring) ("The vast majority of
states that do not acknowledge common law marriages also have rejected a cause of
action for palimony [payments akin to alimony following the dissolution of cohabita-
tion] ...").
38. See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602, 603 (Alaska 1980); Dominguez v.
Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322, 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Monroe v. Monroe, 413 N.E.2d 1154,
1158 (N.Y. 1980); see generally OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 708.
39. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § § 513.075, 513.076 (2008); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §26.01(b)(3) (West 2007). See generally OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35,
at 708.
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these mothers operate within well-defined informal systems of finan-
cial obligations and entitlements created and sustained by various
forms of non-marital horizontal intimate relationships. 40 Many
others have documented the ways in which some adults historically
have formed extended kinship communities, the members of which
undertake significant monetary and in-kind exchanges in order to as-
sist one another. 41
As an additional consideration, some lament the focus on mar-
riage and approximations of marriage (perhaps contractually
created) as a failure in our collective imagination to envision other
institutions for providing social and economic security to individu-
als. 4 2 This discussion regarding our collective values and priorities
points to significant socio-political concerns, mostly located outside of
family law, narrowly defined, but this discussion is beyond the focus
of this work.
D. Cohabitation Contracts
Now that we are clear regarding who we are (and who we likely
are not) talking about in the U.S. context, and now that we have ac-
knowledged though not weighed in on an ongoing debate regarding
the degree to which we should value marriage, 43 below is the discus-
sion of unmarried cohabitants who legally contract for marriage-like
contractual obligations and rights.
The actual tally of how many unmarried intimate partners en-
deavor (or would endeavor) to go through the trouble and bear the
expense of executing contracts to create rights and obligations to gov-
ern their relationships is unknown, but is presumably small.44 Surely
some do. Of note, some particularly diligent same-sex couples rely
40. KATHERINE EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WORK (1997).
41. See Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 18-
19 (2005); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Re-framing the Legal Understand-
ing of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (2008).
42. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAM-
ILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-36 (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW
(2008); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686
(2008); Melissa Murray, Black Marriage, White People, Red Herrings, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 977, 995 (2013); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV.
189, 209-10 (2007).
43. For further discussion in this ongoing debate, specifically in the context of
marriage promotion initiatives instituted during Bush era, see Kaaryn Gustafson,
Breaking Vows: Marriage Promotion, the New Patriarchy, and the Retreat from Egali-
tarianism, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 269, 288 (2009); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The
Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum
Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1675-78 (2005); Theodora Ooms et al., Ctr. for Law &
Soc. Policy, Beyond Marriage Licenses: Efforts in States to Strengthen Marriage and
Two-Parent Families 5-10 (2004).
44. See Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1367 (Oct. 2011).
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upon such contracts in order to provide them with the legal protec-
tions upon dissolution afforded married couples, where these same-
sex couples may not marry within their state of residence.
Marvin v. Marvin is an early U.S. case regarding the enforceabil-
ity of cohabitation contracts, holding, "[t]he fact that a man and a
woman live together without marriage, and engage in a sexual rela-
tionship, does not in itself invalidate agreements between them
relating to their earnings, property or expenses." 45 In Marvin, the
court addressed an alleged oral contract between unmarried persons
for post-relationship support and equitable division of assets. The
court took pains to distinguish this alleged contract from a contract
for sexual services (prostitution), which would be against public pol-
icy and illegal.
In this decision, we therefore see approximations of the market/
family divide discussed earlier in this work, as the court struggles
with the notion that persons involved in a romantic relationship
could execute a contract between themselves. Are the parties con-
tracting for sex? No, the court answered, the parties are contracting
despite the sex, and the sex doesn't invalidate their contractual
arrangements.
Though spurring academic debate and some court decisions, dis-
cussed above, regarding expanded equitable remedies for
cohabitating couples to recover marriage-like benefits upon dissolu-
tion of their relationships, the Marvin case actually was quite limited
in its legal holding; the holding firmly requires the existence of an
express or implied contract for remedy. Indeed, upon remand, the
trial court denied relief, finding that the parties never agreed to
share interest in all property acquired during their relationship and
never agreed that one partner would provide for all of the financial
needs of the other for the rest of her life.46 Further, the trial court on
remand awarded the plaintiff money for the purposes of rehabilita-
tion, but the appellate court struck down this award as an improper
equitable remedy where there was no valid agreement. 47
E. Premarital Contracts
The second way in which parties circumvent the default system
of marriage laws through contract is through prenuptial (or antenup-
tial) agreements. Although states previously maintained that
prenuptial agreements specifying how spouses would divide assets
and/or support one another following a divorce were void, as against
45. 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal. 1976), remanded to 176 Cal. Rpt. 555 (Ct. App. 1981).
46. Id. at 559; see OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 710.
47. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rpt. at 559.
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public policy in encouraging divorce,'4 s today, prenuptial agreements
in contemplation of divorce are not per se unenforceable. 4 9 To the
knowledge of the authors, opposition to these contracts did not en-
gage in a discussion of whether the parties' sexual relationship or
future sexual relationship makes these agreements illegal, as the
Marvin decision queried.5 0
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), created in
1983, adopted, in whole or in part, by half of the states, allows fi-
anc6es wide latitude in opting completely out of a state's statutory
and common law scheme for division of assets and alimony upon di-
vorce. The one blanket restriction within the UPAA concerns child
support, a child's right that "may not be adversely affected by a pre-
marital agreement."5 1 Parties generally also may not contract freely
on issues child custody, though in less specified ways.
The rules applicable to the enforcement and interpretation of
contracts generally apply to prenuptial agreements, both in states
that have adopted the UPAA and the others. Both the UPAA and the
specific laws of most states consider standard contract concepts of un-
conscionability and voluntary consent, with the specific concerns of
coercion, fraud, duress, and undue influence. The extent to which
these concepts and concerns prevent enforcement of prenuptial
agreements that greatly disadvantage one party is all over the board,
nationally. Of particular interest is a court's understanding of the re-
lationship of the parties upon signing: how similar or different is the
relationship of betrothed spouses signing a prenuptial agreement to
the relationship between parties in an arms-length commercial nego-
tiation? Are the parties in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
thereby heightening the standards of their financial disclosure prior
to execution?5 2
48. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Santangelo, 78 A.2d 240, 241 (Conn. 1951). See gener-
ally Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 148-58
(1998); Premarital agreements allowing parties to set forth their wishes upon the
death of a spouse generally speaking always have been enforceable.
49. See, e.g., Van Kipnis v. Van Kipnis, 900 N.E.2d 977, 980 (N.Y. 2008). This
development was not universally heralded as progress. See generally Bix, supra note
48, at 148-58; Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 207-11 (1982); Judith T. Younger, Lov-
ers' Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 349, 352-59 (2007).
50. Although avoided by practitioners and policy advocates, parallels between
marriage and prostitution, immensely taboo, have indeed been made by well-
respected economists, such as Richard Posner, champion of the "law and economics"
discipline. See Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
817, 825 (2000).
51. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 3(b) (1983).
52. U.S. States answer this question somewhat differently. See, e.g., Mallen v.
Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 815 (Ga. 2005) (no confidential or fiduciary relationship prior
to marriage); Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 966 (Ma. 2010) (parties to a
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There are a few ways in which interpretation of prenuptial
agreements clearly veers from standard contract interpretation.
First, when determining whether or not to enforce a prenuptial
agreement, some states consider not only the circumstances sur-
rounding execution of the agreement, but also the circumstances at
the time of enforcement of the agreement. Also interesting for the
authors of this work, while most states understand that the marriage
itself may be valid and sufficient consideration for a prenuptial agree-
ment, upon an implicit understanding that the parties would not
marry but for the prenuptial agreement, the UPAA explicitly states
that prenuptial agreements are enforceable without consideration, in
contradiction of a very basic tenet of standard contract interpreta-
tion. Curiously, the UPAA also states that an amendment or
revocation of a prenuptial agreement also is enforceable without con-
sideration. Unless we consider that continuation of a marriage would
qualify as consideration, this provision of the UPAA is a serious abro-
gation of standard contract interpretation.5 3
At a much broader level, a distinction generally may be made
between the prenuptial agreement as a "partnership agreement,"
taking from the modern view of marriage as a partnership between
spouses,5 4 and a typical business partnership agreement, which
would not concern exclusively the terms of dissolution (the exit pack-
age) but also presumably would include some discussion regarding
the expectations of the partners during the course of the partnership
and the terms of breach that would void or require amendment of
some or all of the terms governing dissolution (termination for cause
provisions). There is no legal requirement for prenuptial agreements
to contain any provisions regarding the expectations of the spouses
during the marriage.5 5 Indeed, although many states retain their
premarital agreement are in confidential relationship with one another but not a fidu-
ciary relationship, owing a duty of absolute fidelity to one another).
53. See generally Whitmore v. Whitmore, 778 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 2004).
54. This view, for example, undergirds the modern legal shift away from title to
equitable division of marital property.
55. Linda McClain, in her work, Family Constitutions and the (New) Constitution
of the Family, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 833 (2006), undertakes a thoughtful discussion of
a new phenomenon of families drafting their own "family constitutions" to govern the
operation of their families and compares these family constitutions to the U.S. Consti-
tution and corporate mission statements. These family constitutions however have no
legal enforceability. Martha Ertman has argued for an expanded view of the purpose
and benefits of contractual bargaining in intimate relationships and proposes con-
tracts that indeed include detailed discussions of expectations during marriage along
with other unenforceable inclusions, i.e. professions of love, arguing that these inclu-
sions help govern the behavior of the parties during the marriage, reduce the
likelihood of dissolution, and the likelihood that the dissolution terms of the agree-
ment will be accepted and not contested upon dissolution. See MARTHA M. ERTMAN,
LOVE & CONTRACTS (forthcoming from Beacon Press 2014). Ertman, Commercializing
Marriage, supra note 29, at 66-68; Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 29, at 92-
98.
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fault grounds for divorce (i.e. adultery, cruel and inhuman treatment,
abandonment) along with their no-fault option, many prenuptial
agreements do not contain any mention of this potential bad behavior
during marriage as cause for modification of the terms of a prenuptial
agreement. This reality exists even while some states still consider
one of these cause categories-adultery-a criminal offense.5 6
Of course, some good attorneys are mindful of negative potential-
ities and advise clients to include so-called "bad boy" clauses in
prenuptial agreements for protection. But "bad boy" clauses in pre-
nuptial agreements are neither required by law nor particularly
common. On the other end of the spectrum, there is an open question
as to whether positive behavior expectation terms in prenuptial
agreements, terms such as the obligation to reside in the same home,
provide sexual affection, or provide housekeeping labor would be en-
forceable, either because courts consider these terms essential
obligations of marriage and therefore without consideration or be-
cause judges just do not feel comfortable enforcing these obligations,
with or without a contract.5 7
Of note, somewhat ironically in light of the original rationale for
prohibiting certain prenuptial agreements, a newer form of premari-
tal contract has appeared on the scene, one expressly designed to
make it harder to divorce-the covenant marriage contract. The au-
thors characterize the covenant marriage contract only partially as
contractual private ordering, for the reasons discussed below.
Three U.S. states maintain covenant marriage contracts, Louisi-
ana, Arkansas and Arizona.58 The statutorily prescribed contractual
terms for a covenant marriage contract in all three states include lim-
iting divorce to situations where there are proven allegations of
serious fault, including adultery, conviction of a felony, abandonment
for one year, or physical or sexual abuse of a spouse or a child of one
56. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 750.30; N.D. STAT. ANN. § 12.1-20-09 (1991); MASS.
STAT. ANN. CH. 272, § 14; GA STAT. ANN. § 16-6-19.
57. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Chapin, 64 N.W. 334, 334 (Mich. 1895) ("[P]romise
to pay for services which the very existence of the relation made it her duty to per-
form, was without consideration."); N.C. Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471,
474 (N.C. 1987) (the law can enforce a duty of support but not a corresponding duty to
render services in the home); OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 510-14, 651-
52.
58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-111, 25-312 -
314, 25-901-906 (2000 & Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-202-215; see also
Kimberly Diane White, Note, Covenant Marriage: An Unnecessary Second Attempt at
Fault-Based Divorce, 61 ALA. L. REV. 869, 872-73 (2010); see also Katherine Shaw
Spaht, Covenant Marriage: An Achievable Legal Response to the Inherent Nature of
Marriage and Its Various Goods, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 467, 482 (2006).
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of the spouses.59 The parties alternatively may obtain a divorce if
they live separate for some period of time.6 0
Different from private ordering in the context of an ordinary pre-
marital agreement, with covenant marriage contracts, the parties do
not create their own terms; instead, the contract terms already exist
as drafted by the state legislature. The parties contract by just sign-
ing up. In this manner, it is perhaps questionable whether the
covenant marriage contract really qualifies as contractual private
ordering.
On the other hand, the Louisiana legislation uniquely imposes
upon the parties some of the terms customarily left out of standard
prenuptial agreements, marriage obligations other than dissolution
rights. For example, the Louisiana statute provides that parties must
agree to mutual love and respect, mutual residence, decision-making
in the best interest of the family, mutual duty for household manage-
ment, and the teaching of children in accordance with their
"capacities, natural inclinations, and aspirations."6 1
F. Postnuptial and Separation Contracts
The third way in which parties circumvent the default laws of
marriage through contract is through postnuptial or separation
agreements, agreements between married spouses. However counter-
intuitive the notion at first may seem, postnuptial and separation
agreements are not meaningfully different as distinct legal catego-
ries. Both postnuptial and separation agreements with varying
degrees set forth the terms for the continuation of the marriage (the
later containing the explicit term of separate residences) as well as
the agreed-upon consequences of divorce.
While courts sometimes treat these agreements similar to pre-
nuptial agreements, postnuptial and separation agreements differ
from prenuptial agreements in key ways.6 2 First, unlike prenuptial
agreements, these contracts cannot have the marriage as the consid-
eration for the agreement.6 3 Second, there is no doubt the parties are
in a confidential or fiduciary relationship with one another, necessa-
rily heightening the requirements of full and fair disclosure before
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-111, 25-312 -
314, 25-901-906 (2000 & Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-202-215; see also
White, supra note 58; Spaht, supra note 58.
60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-111, 25-312 -
314, 25-901-906 (2000 & Supp. 2005); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-202-215; see also White,
supra note 58; Spaht, supra note 58.
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2008); see also Spaht, supra note 58.
62. For a detailed discussion regarding the differing treatment of postnuptial
agreements, see Barbara Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 11 (2012).
63. This would be the case also with any amendment or revocation of a prenuptial
agreement, a situation discussed previously in this work, supra note 46.
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signing. Finally, as parties enter these agreements with the intention
to stay married after some period of marriage and perhaps some mar-
ital discord, these contracts occasionally contain language regarding
how the parties will govern themselves during the marriage, not just
how assets will be divided and support provided upon divorce. Inclu-
sion of terms regarding how the parties will conduct themselves
during the marriage, whether or not the parties will reside in the
same home, how money will be shared and assets managed during
the marriage, distinguishes these agreements from prenuptial agree-
ments in a profound way.
G. Divorce Settlement Contracts
The fourth and most common way in which parties contract hori-
zontal relationships is through divorce settlement agreements,
settling all matters of dispute between divorcing spouses, including
matters involving the parties' children. The authors include divorce
settlement agreements in our discussion of horizontal relationships,
even though divorce settlement agreements also contract, in more
limited fashion, vertical intimate relationships between parents and
children, because these agreements originate primarily from the
breakdown of the horizontal relationship and must be all-inclusive in
resolving both horizontal and vertical disputes.
Somewhat different from the contracts already discussed, divorce
settlement agreements do not, on the whole, represent attempts to
create or veer from established family law, but instead present the
results of negotiations on the basis of the established family law in
the state with jurisdiction over the dispute. Parties executing divorce
settlement agreements are not creating their own rules to govern all
potential eventualities of their marriages; they are agreeing to com-
promise based on the situation and law existing at that time.
In their influential 1979 work, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce," Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser
discussed the ways in which legal rules create bargaining endow-
ments for divorcing spouses.6 4 The legal rules governing spousal and
child support, child custody, and the division of marital assets give
each spouse certain claims or bargaining chips in their negotiations
with each other.6 5 Mnookin and Kornhauser also discuss the effects
that trial uncertainty, varying degrees of risk aversion, and transac-
tion costs have on the negotiation process.6 6 In what we believe is
their most enduring contribution to the discussion of private ordering
in family law, Mnookin and Kornhauser assert: "Discretionary stan-
64. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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dards can substantially affect the relative bargaining strength of the
two parties, primarily because their attitudes toward risk and capaci-
ties to bear transaction costs may differ substantially."67
Family law practice and procedure are rife with judicial discre-
tion, statutorily created and bolstered by the relative lack of
appellate review and accompanying precedent. Legislatures inten-
tionally create systems for adjudication of disputes over child custody
and visitation, distribution of marital assets, spousal support and
even (though to a somewhat lesser degree) child support that provide
judges with vast amounts of discretion upon which to base their deci-
sions after consideration of the facts presented and the character of
the parties presenting those facts (character being something greater
than credibility and more closely resembling the concept of "moral
dessert"). The standard of "best interests of the child" is just one sig-
nificant example. There are equally vague and imprecise standards
for spousal support (how long and for what purposes should it be
awarded) and equitable division of marital assets (what is equitable).
Further, there often is a relative lack of judicial precedent. Be-
yond the real aversion of appellate courts generally to hearing family
law cases, the costs, delays and further uncertainty involved in bring-
ing cases up for appeal means that as a practical matter, few family
law matters will reach the appellate courts for adjudication and es-
tablishment of judicial precedent. Some jurisdictions are better than
others. Jurisdictions more hospitable to hearing family law appeals
and having resident litigants with greater financial capacities to
bring cases up for appeal have more case law, more precedent, and
therefore offer a more predictive quality to negotiations. However, for
the most part, one accurately may describe family law negotiations as
bargaining in the shadow of the unpredictable Wild, Wild West. The
virtual impossibility of predicting court outcomes causes unique chal-
lenges for adversarily-oriented spouses attempting to arrange their
affairs upon divorce privately without resorting to litigation and
third-party adjudication of their disputes.
When parties do resolve their divorce disputes by written settle-
ment agreements, their agreements are subject to standard rules of
contract interpretation and enforcement, without the sort of special-
ized contractual hurdles that may occasion premarital and post
marital agreements. Absent immediate challenge by either party to
the enforceability of these contracts based upon some principle of
standard contract law (i.e. fraud), the parties together will present
these contracts to the court for approval and incorporation into judg-
ments of the court. Once incorporated into final judgments of the
court, these contracts no longer maintain their status as mere private
contract.
67. Id. at 980.
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H. Default Rules of Intimate Horizontal Relationships
For context, below is a broad, general discussion of the existing
law that would govern the legally recognized intimate horizontal re-
lationship, marriage, and the newer legally recognized horizontal
relationships legislatively created in some states, absent an alterna-
tive contractual arrangement. Also, included is additional general
discussion regarding any substantive restrictions on contracting
around the default rules described.
I. Getting Married
There are various state restrictions on who may marry. These
state restrictions include minimum age requirements and prohibi-
tions against the marriage of persons related to one another, bigamy,
polygamy, and (in most remaining states) same-sex marriage.68 Re-
strictions against marriage due to income/wealth, 69 incarceration, 70
and race7 ' have been struck down by the Supreme Court and no
longer exist in any state.
Simply said, there is no way for private parties to contract
around valid state restrictions on who may marry, nor may private
parties limit the marriage prospects of others, including their sons
and daughters, by contract. These contractual limitations notwith-
standing, parties generally may work around existing restrictions,
where state laws vary, by getting married in another state. Such
marriages generally receive federal recognition and, with the excep-
tion of same-sex marriages, other state recognition.7 2
J. Rights and Responsibilities during Marriage
Historically, the states imposed a "duty of necessaries" upon hus-
bands, requiring husbands to pay the necessary expenses of their
wives. 73 By Supreme Court mandate, states now must apply this
principle in a gender-neutral fashion, so that wives also would bear
responsibility for their husband's necessary expenses.7 4 However,
some states have abandoned this principle altogether. Where the
principle still applies, with the exception of ordering payment to third
68. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
69. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978).
70. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).
71. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
72. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. IV, §1. Unchallenged
provisions of DOMA currently prevent application of full faith and credit to out-of-
state same-sex marriages.
73. See Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage": Reconsidering the Duty of
Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2003); see, e.g., N.C. Baptist Hosp.,
Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471 (N.C. 1987).
74. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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parties to pay spousal expenses, courts have been reluctant to apply
this principle and to quantify this ongoing duty during a marriage.7 5
Beyond this unspecific duty of financial support, states impose
no real marital duties upon spouses toward one another, to the extent
that spouses would have any cause of action in court for failure to
perform. As discussed below, the advent of no-fault divorce and the
potential that fault may be excluded as a factor relevant to the distri-
bution of assets and alimony, means that obligations customarily
understood to accompany marriage, such as sexual fidelity and kind
treatment, lose the force of law.
K Getting Divorced
Some form of no-fault default divorce exists in all fifty U.S.
states,7 6 meaning spouses no longer must prove some element of fault
in order to get a divorce. Parties generally cannot contract to limit (or
expand) causes of action for divorce by contract. The one exception
remains covenant marriage contracts, statutory creations of states
expressly allowing parties to expand limitations on their rights to
divorce.
L. Division of Assets upon Divorce
U.S. states generally classify assets upon divorce as either mari-
tal assets, assets acquired during the marriage, or separate assets,
assets acquired before the marriage or through bequest, devise, or
gift.77 Once a court determines that certain property is separate, typ-
ically, the court will award this property to the spouse with title to
the property.78
U.S. states then employ two alternate methods of dividing prop-
erty upon divorce: community property or equitable distribution. In
community property states, courts generally divide marital property
equally (50/50). In equitable distribution states, courts generally di-
vide property acquired during the marriage equitably, as determined
by the court. Although not usually codified by statute, people in-
volved in litigation in equitable distribution jurisdictions sometimes
conceptually begin with consideration of 50/50 division of marital as-
sets and then move back and forth along the percentages based on
some combination of factors, including contributions to the acquisi-
75. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
76. See also OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 514.
77. JOHN E.B. MYERS, EXPERIENCING FAMILY LAW 536 (2013).
78. There are some exceptions. In addition to alimony, which is precisely an
award of separate property to the other spouse, some states authorize awards of sepa-
rate property. See MAss GEN. LAWS. ANN. Ch. 208, § 34 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46B-81(a) (1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-7-4(a)(1997); Williams v. Massa, 728
N.E.2d 932 (2000); Krafick v. Krafick, 663 A.2d 365, 370 (Conn. 1995); MYERS, supra
note 77, at 539.
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tions of the assets, marital fault, and need.7 9 The laws of community
property and equitable distribution embody the important notion of a
marriage as a "partnership," and so property acquired through the
effort or skill of ether "partner" belongs to the partnership. 0
Significant fine distinctions and qualifications appear in the case
law of equitable distribution and community property division, so
that litigation regarding asset division upon divorce may become
quite complex and expensive. As just a few examples, there are classi-
fication of asset issues, such the termination of the acquisition of
marital assets, which could be the date of the divorce judgment or
some date prior (when the parties ceased working together as a part-
nership), and the appreciation of separate assets, which could be due
to the efforts of one or both of the partners and therefore arguably
should be characterized as marital. There are valuation issues,
prompting the use of an array of valuation experts, such as real es-
tate appraisers and art appraisers. There are distribution issues,
such as the method for dividing the value of a marital home (should
the court order the parties to sell it?) and the method for dividing a
closely held business between antagonistic spouses.
In addition, the state of New York has expanded notions of mari-
tal property to include future property not yet acquired. For example,
New York State has well-established law on Enhanced Earning Ca-
pacity, a principle initially applied to the division of professional
degrees, such as medical licenses, which enable one spouse an en-
hanced earning capacity, and if earned during the marriage, the
principle holds, should be divided upon divorce. 8' The case law then
expanded the principle to apply to other certifications and then
merely to any professional advancement during the marriage ena-
bling one spouse to earn a significantly higher income than he would
have without such advancement. Once enhanced earning capacity be-
comes a marital asset, New York courts employ a complex system for
valuing this asset and then awarding an equitable portion of it to the
other spouse upon divorce, in a form of payments that may resemble
alimony, but instead are explicitly property division. 2
As before discussed, parties may displace these community prop-
erty or equitable distribution regimes by prenuptial agreement, as
long as the parties adhere to the governing contractual requirements.
Often, the explicit goal of one of the parties initiating a prenuptial
79. See MYERS, supra note 77, at 536; see, e.g., In re Dube, 44 A.3d 556, 575 (N.H.
2012) ("[New Hampshire's equitable distribution law] creates a presumption that
equal distribution of marital property is equitable.").
80. See generally MYERS, supra note 77, at 536.
81. The case that started it all was O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y.
1985).
82. See also Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796 (Wis. 1984) (court also attempts
to compensate a spouse for the enhanced earning capacity of the other acquired dur-
ing the marriage).
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agreement will be to avoid the acquisition of marital assets alto-
gether or the transmutation of separate assets into marital assets
based upon appreciation during the marriage. As long as the parties
respect the relevant contractual requirements, as discussed earlier in
this work, this goal is acceptable; the parties may do as they please
according to their own consciences.
8 3
M. Spousal Support upon Divorce
Alimony, also termed spousal support or spousal maintenance, is
an award out of the separate estate of one spouse to the other spouse.
Alimony may be periodic, over time, or lump sum (awarded in one
chunk). Lifetime alimony is just that, alimony awarded periodically
as long as both spouses shall live. Alimony is terminable upon the
death of the receiving spouse (and usually the payor spouse) or upon
the remarriage of the receiving spouse. In some cases, alimony termi-
nates when the receiving spouse begins living with another person in
a relationship akin to marriage. There is also temporary alimony oth-
erwise known as temporary support or support pendente lite,
payments from one spouse to another during the pendency of the di-
vorce litigation. Some states consider awards of attorney's fees,
designed to level the playing field between spouses so they both can
afford equally effective counsel, part of temporary alimony. 4
Courts award alimony generally based upon the need of one
spouse and the ability to pay of the other. The frequency, in addition
to the length and duration of awards of spousal support, has de-
creased rapidly over the years. Lifetime alimony has become almost
non-existent. And the rationale for awards of alimony has moved over
time generally from an emphasis on an enhanced conception of duty
and need characteristic of a society with few opportunities for women
to earn income and a system of laws that distributed assets upon di-
vorce according to title, to an impoverished, sex-neutral conception of
need, 15 allowing either spouse (perhaps) a limited period of alimony
for quick rehabilitation based upon only those perceived educational
and professional sacrifices made by that spouse. Alimony awards ac-
cordingly have become "more complicated and difficult to predict."8 6
Unlike property division, there are some substantive restrictions
on private ordering of spousal support by prenuptial agreement. The
83. As before discussed, some jurisdictions impose contractual requirements that
do indeed impose morality upon these agreements, employing principles of "uncon-
scionability" and "unfairness based upon changed circumstances." These are
contractual requirements not restrictions on contract terms, but the lines can become
a little blurred.
84. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.16 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-2 (West 1985).
85. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that sex is not a "reliable proxy for
need."); see also OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 514.
86. OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 510.
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majority of states allow parties to waive alimony within the terms of
a prenuptial agreement. However, at least four states (California,
Iowa, New Mexico and South Dakota) expressly refuse to allow par-
ties to waive their right to alimony in a premarital agreement.8 7
Further, some states, even if they allow waivers of alimony, abso-
lutely prohibit waivers of temporary alimony.
N. Fault?
Of particular note, although all states now have incorporated
some form of no-fault divorce, states differ considerably on the issue
of whether or not marital fault is relevant and admissible for pur-
poses of determining the division of marital assets and alimony.
Some states require courts to consider the conduct of the parties
in dividing assets.8 8 Other states prohibit the consideration of con-
duct in dividing assets or awarding alimony. 9 Some states have
some mixed version of allowing fault for considerations of division of
marital assets but not alimony or vice versa.90 Some states statuto-
rily bar alimony awards to payee spouses who have committed
adultery but have no similar statutory provision directing courts to
increase alimony where the payor has committed adultery. 9 1
Practically, some cunning attorneys may attempt to introduce
evidence of fault, even where prohibited, as evidence otherwise rele-
vant to financial matters, for example, the dissipation of marital
assets on an extra-marital affair.9 2 Whether or not fault is relevant,
and whether or not fault is likely to be introduced at trial, may give
greater bargaining power to one spouse over the other, thereby dra-
matically affecting divorce settlement negotiations.
0. Domestic Partnerships and Civil Unions
Currently, seven U.S. states offer domestic partnerships and/or
civil unions to citizens who wish to take on many of the rights and
responsibilities of marriage, without marriage. For a same-sex couple
living in a state where marriage is not yet legal for same-sex part-
ners, a domestic partnership or civil union is the only option for
establishing a legally recognized intimate horizontal relationship. In
87. Bix, supra note 48, at 157.
88. See OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 169-170; see, e.g., R.I. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. § 15-5-16.1 (West 2004); Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1992).
89. See OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 169-170; see, e.g., In re Mar-
riage of Tjaden, 199 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa 1972); Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636
(Alaska 1989); In re Marriage of Boseman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973).
90. See OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 169-70; see, e.g., Chapman v.
Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Ky. 1973).
91. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1(c) (1979).
92. See Fernanda G. Nicola, Intimate Liability: Tort Law, Family Law and the
Stereotyped Narratives of Interspousal Torts, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 445
(2013)
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some states, the designation of domestic partnership or civil union
affords the couple the same rights and obligations of marriage, with-
out the marriage title.
For example, New Jersey's statute offering civil unions to same-
sex couples provides individuals united by civil union with the same
state benefits and protections afforded married persons, including
dissolution rights.9 3 Of note, the New Jersey civil union statute ex-
plicitly provides that parties in civil unions may use prenuptial
agreements in the same manner as married spouses.9 4
III. CONTRACTING VERTICAL INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
As we first tracked the various types of permissible horizontal
relationship contracts before discussing the underlying default legal
rules governing horizontal intimate relationships absent contracts,
we now do the same for vertical relationships. Possible contracting
occurs with regard to the establishment of parentage and with regard
to disputes between legal parents.
A. Contracting Parentage in Assisted Reproduction
In recent decades, assisted reproductive technology has intro-
duced new issues of multiple contenders for parenthood. 95 The
technology has advanced much faster than the law, resulting in very
different legal treatment in each state. 9 6 In response, the Uniform
Law Commission adopted the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000
(UPA).9 7 Although several states have adopted and expanded upon
the UPA, jurisdictional differences abound. For this reason, below is
a broad, general discussion of how individuals may contract parent-
age through assisted reproduction under current state laws
attempting to regulate the practice and its consequences.
B. Egg or Sperm Donation Contracts
The enforceability of contracts pertaining to egg and sperm dona-
tion is varied and uncertain among the states' laws. This uncertainty
exists against a backdrop of varied states laws governing the rights
and responsibilities of the parties involved, absent a contract. As a
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-32 (West 2007).
94. Id.
95. See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 572 (6th ed.
2012) (explaining that in the case of surrogacy using in vitro fertilization, there may
be easily be six contenders for parenthood: two intended parents, one sperm donor,
one egg donor, a gestational surrogate and her husband).
96. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 644 (Wis. 2013) ("The ability to create a
family using ART has seemingly outpaced legislative responses to the legal questions
it presents, especially the determination of parentage"); see also Elrod & Spector,
supra note 16, at 624.
97. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory note, at 2 (2002).
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threshold matter, some states establish a default rule preventing egg
and sperm donors from acquiring parental rights and obligations; 9
some states do the opposite and impose parentage upon donors. Con-
tracts providing for alternative arrangements may or may not be
enforced by the courts.
For example, some states and not others enforce contracts sup-
porting sperm donors who wish to contract for parental rights and
responsibilities, despite statutory bars against paternity for sperm
donors.9 9 Another example occurs in the case of "ovum sharing,"
where lesbian partners extract the egg from one partner, fertilize it
and insert it into the other for gestation and birth. In contradiction of
its general statutory rule that egg donors do not enjoy parental
rights, at least one state appears statutorily to accept (and require)
an actual written contract stating the intentions of the parties that
the egg donor will assume parental rights before affording parentage
to the egg donor. 10 0
C. Surrogacy Contracts
Following the widely publicized 1988 Baby M case, 10 many
states legislatively declared all surrogacy contracts void and unen-
forceable, and some states even instituted civil and criminal
penalties for these contracts.' 0 2 Several of these states have since in-
validated or repealed their laws prohibiting and/or criminalizing
98. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 702 cmt. (2002) (explaining that donors may not
sue to establish parentage and may not be sued to obtain support for the child); see,
e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West 2008).
99. See e.g. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (refusing to apply a blanket
statutory bar to donor parental rights to the sperm donor in the case because he had
evidence of an oral agreement with the mother to be considered the natural father of
the child); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:11 (West 2013) (stating that an
agreement is writing is sufficient to privately guarantee a sperm donor's parentage);
McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied 495 U.S. 905 (1990)
(concluding that the blanket statutory bar to donor parental rights would violate the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the donor had an agreement to
have rights and responsibilities as a parent). See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618
N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (imposing paternity on biological father de-
spite agreement that he would be sperm donor only).
100. See, e.g. T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); In re
Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sur. Ct. 2009). See generally Nancy D. Poli-
koff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for
Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201
(2009).
101. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)(concluding that the contract violates New Jersey
public policy by privately arranging custody matters when the state is the ultimate
arbiter of the best interests of the child in custody matters).
102. See Donald P. Myers, 7 States Prohibit Surrogacy for Pay, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6,
1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-06/news/vw-70 1 states-prohibit-surrogacy
(explaining that in the year since In the Matter of Baby M, was decided, seven states
had banned surrogacy and twelve additional states were considering similar legisla-
tion); See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859 (1988).
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surrogacy contracts, now permitting surrogacy contracts, under strict
regulations with contractual requirements. 10 3
While some states still will not enforce surrogacy contracts and
statutorily mandate that a gestational mother is the parent,10 4 the
enforceability of surrogacy agreements with contractual require-
ments is the position now advocated in the Uniform Parentage
Act,' 0 5 and the position many states now follow.
As just a few examples of the types of contractual requirements
states may impose before enforcing surrogacy contracts, some states
have eligibility requirements, such as a minimum age; commission-
ing parent requirements, such as the gestating incapacity of the
commissioning mother and her marriage; transaction requirements,
such as non-mandatory surrender until expiration of a waiting period
and prohibitions on "commercial surrogacy" or surrogacy for pay-
ment;' 0 6 and judicial pre-authorization. 0 7
D. Private and Open Adoption Contracts
We outline the basics of adoption default rules in the U.S. later
in this work but wanted to mention here an important development
in parentage by adoption accomplished through private contract.
While a small number of states outright prohibit independent or pri-
vate adoption contracts,' 08 most states permit private adoption
agreements between birth and adoptive parents, negotiated outside
the confines of state-run adoption agencies, though typically with
103. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(a) (1989), invalidated by Soos v. Su-
perior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (declaring the law
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Surrogacy Parenting Agreement Act of
2013, Council 32, Period Twenty (D.C. 2013) (proposing that surrogacy contracts com-
plying with various requirements be considered presumptively valid); S.B. 4617,
236th Leg., Reg. Session (N.Y. 2013) (proposing that surrogacy contracts complying
with numerous requirements be enforced through judgment of parentage).
104. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05. See COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON
MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 4:9 (2012).
105. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (2002).
106. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2713 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 1989). Scholars have criti-
cized this altruistic rhetoric as reinforcing gender norms about motherhood and
monetary motivation. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the
Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 247 (2009); see generally RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman
and Joan C. Williams, eds., 2005).
107. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (providing minimum age re-
quirement of eighteen years old and requiring commissioning parents to be married);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25 (West 2013) (providing mandatory terms including a
term that allows a surrogate to keep the child if she signs a written intent to keep the
child and delivers the writing to the intended parents within seventy-two hours of the
birth of the child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23 (West 2013) (requiring judicial
pre-authorization); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (West 2000) (requiring judicial
validation).
108. See COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 2:4 (2012).
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state oversight and regulation. 10 9 As a more recent development,
some states now also allow parties to negotiate and contract various
terms of an "open" adoption, permitting a birth parent to terminate
her parental rights while retaining some right to post-adoption con-
tact with the child." 0 As discussed later in this work, enforcement of
open adoption contracts allows parties to avoid the default rule that
an adoption severs completely the relationship with a birth parent.
E. Co-Parenting Contracts for Non-Legal Parents
Some non-legal parents preemptively execute co-parenting
agreements with legal parents, demonstrating the desires of these
adults to share parenting responsibilities for the child, even though
one is not a legal parent. Co-parenting agreements may or may not be
enforced, depending on the state."'
F. Contract Resolution of Conflict between Legal Parents
Once established as legal parents, parents may resolve disputes
over custody and support for their children by contract. Here, again
we take another break to put our inquiry into context. The general
framework of legal rights and responsibilities that attach to legal
parenthood (rights of access and decision-making with obligations of
care and financial support) operates with little if any judicial over-
sight, except in two discreet scenarios. The first is state intervention
caused by alleged abuse or neglect, undertaken according to a highly
complex child protection system, where the state becomes an investi-
gator and potentially a party in litigation against a parent on behalf
of a child.
The second scenario of judicial oversight of parenting, of impor-
tance for the instant work, is private family law litigation, where
parties invite state intervention because they cannot get along with
each other regarding their children. As just one illustration, although
courts are unlikely to review, much less scrutinize the parenting ac-
tions of two married parents, upon divorce, a court may scrutinize
quite heavily the actions of both parents (with granular detail) in the
context of a custody trial.1 2
109. See Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7 v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 829-30 (1999) (discussing
the principle that private adoption agreements must conform to state statutory re-
quirements in order to be enforceable, making them different from other types of
contracts).
110. Open adoption agreements have become more popular in the U.S. See, e.g.,
Weinschel v. Strople, 466 A.2d 1301, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
111. COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANS-
GENDER FAMILY LAW § 5:31 (2012).
112. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 ch.1, topic 1, overview of the current legal context (2002).
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This is important because we must realize that while parents
privately order their intimate vertical relationships every day, with-
out contracts, 1 1 3 and without judicial review, intraparental conflict
brings legal parents (and sometimes others with interests in chil-
dren, i.e. grandparents) before the courts and opens the possibility of
private ordering by contract, in settlement, in order to avoid a final
adjudication by the courts.
G. Child Custody Settlement Contracts
After a child custody matter is brought before a court in the na-
ture of a custody action or as an ancillary issue in a divorce action,
legal parents may resolve their disputes and agree upon a custodial
arrangement, but not without presenting this agreement to the court
for approval." 4 Indeed, many state statutes now require parents to
execute and present parenting plan agreements, which in many
states are pre-designed forms on which the parents select between
pre-designed options for custodial arrangements and sign. Parties
who prefer to execute more personalized, lengthy settlement agree-
ments regarding custody often then will reference their lengthier
agreements in such required forms. Such parenting plan agreements,
whether outlined in lengthier agreements or as checked boxes on a
form, often cover not only the residential location of the child, but
also the specific time the child shall spend with each parent, how
child transfers will take place, and which parent shall make daily
decisions and those more significant decisions regarding, for exam-
ple, schooling and religion.
While all states require some form of court oversight of agree-
ments regarding children, states vary in the degree to which they
allow judges to set aside, or abandon, these agreements based upon
the judge's discretion regarding the best interests of the children in-
volved." 5 In practice, unless an agreement-on its face-presents a
child custody arrangement that seems clearly harmful to the children
subject to the dispute, courts rarely will disturb it, as courts unlikely
113. But see McClain, supra note 55, at 845 (describing the ways that family con-
stitutions guide daily life).
114. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §2.06 (2002).
115. Johnson v. Johnson, 9 A.3d 1003 (N.J. 2010) (setting forth a system for judi-
cial review of arbitration awards, deferring to the agreements unless a party contests
the agreement as being harmful to the child, and requiring a record of all documen-
tary evidence from the arbitration be kept for the purpose of this review.); Illinois
mandates that mediated agreements regarding financial assets be upheld unless the
agreements are unconscionable, but mediated agreements pertaining to children
must be determined to be in the children's best interest. See MODEL FAMILY LAW ARBI-
TRATION ACT (Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 2004); Ronald S. Granberg & Sarah A.
Cavassa, Private Ordering and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MAT-
RIMONIAL LAW. 287 (2010); see also John Lande, The Revolution in Family Law
Dispute Resolution, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 411, 443 (2012).
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have the information necessary to question its terms. 1 1 6 Likewise,
parties may not amend custody agreements privately (at least not if
they wish the amendments to have legal effect), as amendments also
require judicial approval.
H. Child Support Settlement Contracts
In the specific area of child support, court supervision over con-
tractual terms indeed may be more taxing. The Federal government
mandates that states create guidelines for child support using spe-
cific descriptive and numerical criteria, 1 7 and while individual state
child support guidelines vary, sometimes significantly, all state child
support guidelines explicitly limit the terms upon which parties may
agree privately regarding how they will divide the financial obliga-
tions of their children upon divorce.
Courts will require a joint showing by the parties that their
agreements regarding child support conform to the child support
guidelines of that jurisdiction. Agreements or awards not attaching
an adequate showing of conformity often will be tossed out completely
by the presiding judge, sometimes to the great frustrations of parties
and their attorneys who have spent significant time negotiating those
terms in the context of the overall settlement.
L Default Rules of Intimate Vertical Relationships
For context, below is a broad, general discussion of the existing
law that would govern the legally recognized intimate vertical rela-
tionship of parent and child, absent an alternative contractual
arrangement, first discussing generally who qualifies as a legal par-
ent under default rules, and then discussing generally how states
divvy rights and responsibilities between legal parents and others.
This discussion is by no means exhaustive, as the law of parentage is
ever-evolving and far too vast for this work.
J. Legal Parentage by Biology or Marriage
Absent a contract, or some other factual scenario, such as adop-
tion or assisted reproduction, legal parenthood in the U.S. generally
is a function of biology with a marital presumption, based on a two-
parent model of one legal father and one legal mother. Maternity is
traditionally easy to determine based on the woman giving birth to
the child, and rarely gives rise to dispute, except where complicated
by assisted reproduction.
116. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 955-56.
117. Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (1996); see Jane C. Venohr &
Tracy E. Griffith, Child Support Guidelines: Issues and Reviews, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 415
(2005); see also Lande, supra note 115, at 443.
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Paternity is more typically contested, and courts have devised
various sets of legal principles determining legal fatherhood. For ex-
ample, courts generally presume a husband is the father of his wife's
children born during the marriage, and for a short period after di-
vorce or death." 8 A husband may challenge this presumption in
court in most states, but it is a very strong presumption to over-
come." 9 Outside the marriage context, courts usually determine
paternity based on biology using genetic testing.2 0
Additionally, in 1996, Congress compelled each state to adopt
procedures for men to acknowledge their paternity without adjudica-
tion.' 2 ' Under the resulting state laws, men may sign standard forms
voluntarily acknowledging or denying paternity, filing such forms
with the state agency maintaining birth records.'2 2
K Legal Parentage by Adoption
Adoption is a parent-child relationship created by the states, au-
thorized expressly by state statutes, and regulated intensely by the
states. 2 3 The adoption process typically begins with the termination
of the parental rights of the birth mother, and if known, the birth
father, and relinquishment of the child to a state-regulated adoption
agency.
Prospective adoptive parents typically then must seek approval
directly from the adoption agency, which maintains minimum eligi-
bility requirements, often state-mandated, and conducts extensive
investigations to verify the appropriateness of the placement. Follow-
ing agency approval, prospective adoptive parents typically must
receive judicial approval in order for the adoption to proceed.' 24
The advent of step-parent and second parent adoption is particu-
larly important to note, as an aberration of the standard adoption
framework. While a typical adoption terminates the existing parent-
child relationship of the birth parent and substitutes it with a new
parent-child relationship with the adoptive parent, states allowing
step-parent and second-parent adoption by statute or judicial prece-
dent provide an exception to this framework, allowing adoptive
parentage without destroying the parentage of the birth parent. Step-
118. See MYERS, supra note 77, at 143; See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105
(West 2013).
119. See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Pa. 1999) ("[T]hat a child
born to a married woman is the child of the woman's husband-has been one of the
strongest presumptions known to the law.").
120. See, e.g., People ex rel. B.W., 17 P.3d 199, 201 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) ("There is
no presumption of paternity in regard to children born to unmarried parents.").
121. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (1996).
122. Id. See also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 303 (2002).
123. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8600 (West 1992).
124. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (West 2012); Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Chil-
dren & Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004).
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parent adoption permits the adoption by a married adult of his
spouse's child. Second parent adoption permits the adoption by an
intimate partner, including a same-sex partner, of his partner's
child.'2 5
Once a legal adoption takes place, the adoptive parents assume
all of the rights and obligations of legal parenthood, including the
rights and obligations of custody and child support.
L. Child Custody
States consider two main forms of child custody for legal par-
ents-physical and legal custody. Physical custody refers to the right
to have the child physically present with the parent. Visitation or
parenting time is a part of physical custody. Legal custody refers to
the right to make decisions concerning the child. Physical and legal
custody do not have to be exclusive; parents may share physical and
legal custody, so that the child travels between the care of the par-
ents and both parents make decisions for the child or somehow divide
decision-making authority by subject matter or according to physical
custody.
States generally must make additional findings of parental unfit-
ness before removing all forms of custody from a parent, essentially
terminating his parental rights. 1 2 6 There is no longer a physical or
legal custodial presumption in favor of the mother or the father.'2 7
Some states authorize courts to consider and sometimes defer to the
wishes of the child (usually above a certain age) in determining phys-
ical custodial arrangements.
The majority of U.S. states authorize courts to use the legal stan-
dard of "best interest of the child" in making determinations about
custody. While the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) and
various state statutes provide specific factors for courts to consider in
determining the best interest of the child, this standard remains
amorphous, allowing courts significant discretion in determining is-
sues of child custody.
State laws on custody vary, and parents often litigate both the
choice of law and the appropriate jurisdiction for resolving their child
custody disputes, in no small part because custody jurisdiction out-
comes also may limit a parent's ability to relocate across state lines
with a child. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforce-
125. See, e.g., Sharon S. V. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003) (finding that a
woman intending to coparent with another adult who has agreed to adopt the child is
permitted to waive the statutory benefit of "giv[ing] up all rights of custody, services,
and earnings" as provided on California's official independent adoption agreement
form). See generally Katherine M. Swift, Parenting Agreements, the Potential Power of
Contract, and the Limits of Family Law, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 914 (2007).
126. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982).
127. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981).
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ment Act (UCCJEA), codified into the statutes of all fifty states,
provides detailed, though complex, procedures for courts to determine
which state's substantive law applies and which state court has juris-
diction to adjudicate a family law dispute involving child custody.'1 2
M. Child Support
States maintain specific child support guidelines, according to
federal mandate. These guidelines vary widely from state to state in
substance and specificity. Most states employ an "income sharing"
model that dictates an appropriate amount of support for a child
based on the combined incomes of the parents and then prorates this
amount between the parents based on the percentage of income at-
tributable to each of them. In contrast, some states maintain a
"percentage-of-income" model that dictates the amount of support
owed by the nonresidential parent as a state-mandated percentage of
his or her income. States generally consider the number of children
financially supported by the nonresidential parent in determining
support. Some states, with significant variations in approach, also
consider parenting time offsets for child support obligations based
upon extensive physical custodial time. Parenting time offsets be-
come particularly contested in situations where the parents share
almost equal physical custody.
Some states cap the level of income that courts consider in deter-
mining child support, so that a middle-class parent may have the
same child support obligation as a very wealthy parent, these states
reasoning that the financial needs of children should have limits. 1 2 9
Other states do not so cap the income levels, these states reasoning
that children should be able to enjoy the standard of living they
would enjoy if residing with the wealthy parent. 30 Even states that
cap the levels of support usually allow some form of upward deviation
based on high income, and all states allow for deviations based upon
the extraordinary needs of a child. States also allow for downward
deviations in cases where the support payments would leave the non-
residential parent without sufficient income to live above a
determined poverty level.
Additionally, despite specified guidelines, and in many states,
statutory child support worksheets, there is always room for contest
and negotiation over the appropriate child support payments one par-
ent should pay to the other. Of greatest importance is the method for
determining parental income, as issues such as overtime pay, peri-
odic but irregular income, and voluntary unemployment play a
128. The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(2000), also governs these issues.
129. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (West 2011).
130. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058 (West 1993).
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significant role in child support outcomes, as they can in alimony
outcomes.
As state laws on child support vary significantly, parents often
litigate both the choice of law and which jurisdiction is appropriate
for resolving their child support disputes, as the law and jurisdiction
may have enormous impacts on the amount owed. The federal Uni-
form Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) has been codified into
the state statutes and is the law of all fifty states. This uniform law
creates well-defined, though complex, procedures for courts to deter-
mine which state substantive law applies and which state court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate a family law disputes involving child
support.
N. Non-Legal Parents
In recent years, state legislatures began creating statutory pro-
tections for third-parties, most commonly grandparents, who are not
legal parents but who desire legally guaranteed rights of access to
children. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville con-
firmed that only legal parents have constitutionally protected rights
to children, rights that third-parties, including grandparents, gener-
ally may not infringe.' 3 ' There is still plenty of room for legally
guaranteed third-party visitation and custody following the Troxel
decision, and many third-party visitation and custody statutes re-
main good law.13 2
In addition, of note, though not discussed at length in this work,
de facto legal parentage for adults who are not legal parents but who
effectively behave as parents is an important principle recognized in
at least one jurisdiction in the U.S.' 33
IV. CONTRACTING METHOD-ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Individuals involved in disputes pertaining to legally recognized
vertical and horizontal relationships may resolve their disputes
through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, including me-
diation and arbitration, as would litigants in any other civil action. In
addition to typical ADR, as similar but distinctly different from medi-
ation, collaborative family law is another ADR method.
Interestingly, although the application of civil procedure to fam-
ily disputes historically has not been without vigorous debate and
skepticism, leading, for example, to the specialty family law courts
131. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
132. See OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 35, at 336; see also Sonya C. Garza,
The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and Legislatures, 69 LA.
L. REV. 927 (2009).
133. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-831.01 et seq. (providing that a "de facto par-
ent" has standing to seek custody or visitation).
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with their unique procedural rules1 3 4 and to the many distinctive
substantive rules applicable to the family, as discussed in this work,
general receptiveness to the application of civil ADR to family dis-
putes has been comparatively unremarkable.' 35 Indeed, as scholar
Amy Cohen documents, many indeed have presented the resolution
of family disputes through ADR as the gold standard, a model for the
resolution of ordinary civil matters.' 3 6
A. Mediation
Mediation is a process by which parties in family law litigation
resolve their disputes through the assistance of a neutral, third-party
facilitator who does not have authority to impose binding decisions
upon the parties; the parties ultimately must agree to any resolu-
tion.' 37 In an effort to encourage the use of mediation in resolving
family law disputes, many states offer dispute resolution services
through the court system at a reduced rate to make mediation afford-
able for most litigants. Often, courts order parties to mediate before
proceeding to trial.' 38 Typically, mediators meet certain mandated
requirements in terms of training and experience, but mediator re-
quirements vary substantially from state to state. 39
There is a plethora of debate and scholarship, among academics,
policy-makers and practitioners, regarding the appropriateness of
mediation, especially court-ordered mediation, in situations where
intimate partner violence exists or potentially exists, as mediation
presumes parties come to the negotiation table with equal bargaining
capabilities, free from the control of the other party, a situation
thwarted by the presence of violence within the relationship. 140 This
emphasis and concern are warranted.
134. See Halley, supra note 26; Janet Halley, What is Family Law: A Genealogy
Part 11, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189 (2011).
135. Amy J. Cohen, The Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. Disp. RESOL. 91
(2011).
136. Id.
137. See Lande, supra note 115, at 423; Andrew Schepard, An Introduction to the
Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, 35 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3
(2001); see also Ann L. Milne et al., The Evolution of Divorce and Family Mediation:
An Overview, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICA-
TIONS 4-6, 10-13 (Jay Folberg et al., 2004).
138. See Nancy Ver Steegh, Family Court Reform and ADR: Shifting Values and
Expectations Transform the Divorce Process, 42 FAM. L.Q. 659, 669-70 (2008); see also
Carrie-Anne Tondo, et al., Mediation Trends, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 445 (2001).
139. See Ver Steegh, supra note 138, at 662; see also Connie J.A. Beck & Bruce D.
Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 989, 995 (2000); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Media-
tion: Reflections on a Decade of Research, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 16 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., (1989).
140. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MEDIATION IN FAMILY LAW
MATTERS WHERE DV Is PRESENT (2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/damlabalmigrated/domviol/docs/mediation-jan-uary 2008.authcheckdam.pdf
(listing of state rules); Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al., The Mediator's Assessment of
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What however is peculiar is the relative dearth of scholarship
and debate on the impact of intimate partner violence in the con-
tracting contexts discussed earlier in this work, i.e. cohabitation
agreements, prenuptial agreements, surrogacy agreements, those
that are pre-conflict but still adversarial in nature. Except for the
specter of added involuntariness with respect to court-ordered media-
tion and, of course, the greater frequency of mediated divorce and
child custody and support settlements in general versus these other
agreements, there is no rational explanation for the discrepancy.
Why does partner control in one contracting context matter but not in
the other? Further, the concern specifically with "intimate partner
violence" with its very well defined scholarship-driven definitional
qualities may obscure the general concern over bargaining inequali-
ties more broadly. 1 4 1
B. Collaborative Law
Collaborative law differs from friendly negotiations in the media-
tion context or otherwise, in that parties agreeing to the collaborative
process sign a pledge that prevents their attorneys from ever litigat-
ing their disputes, if the parties are unable to come to an
agreement.' 4 2 Popular 43 though controversial, 44 collaborative law
is an ADR method that must be considered; although substantively,
in terms of our inquiry into the ways in which parties privately re-
solve their disputes, there is little substantive difference between
agreements reached collaboratively and those reached through medi-
ation or other settlement negotiations.
C. Arbitration
Alternatively, arbitration is a process whereby parties in conflict
agree to the substitution of a third-party in place of the judge with
jurisdiction over the subject dispute and by agreement vest this
third-party with the authority to hear evidence and decide the dis-
Safety Issues and Concerns (MASIC): A Screening Interview for Intimate Partner Vio-
lence and Abuse Available in the Public Domain, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 646 (2010); Connie
J. A. Beck & Chitra Raghavan, Intimate Partner Abuse Screening in Custody Media-
tion: The Importance of Assessing Coercive Control, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 555 (2010).
141. See Jana Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, Wis. L. REV. (1992) (dis-
cussing bargaining inequalities, generally, and in the context of ADR).
142. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DIsp. RESOL. L.J. 317,
319-21, 326-32 (2004).
143. REGINA A. DEMETEO, HISTORY OF COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE (2011) (reporting
that The International Academy of Collaborative Professionals has over 4,000 mem-
bers in 24 countries around the world and estimates that there are over 22,000
collaboratively-trained lawyers worldwide).
144. Despite the increasing popularity of collaborative law, there is considerable
disagreement among family law attorneys as to its benefits.
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pute, in a decision that will bind the parties. 145 Parties would agree
to use arbitration in order to control the timing of their litigation and
the identity of the decision-maker, not necessarily to control the sub-
stance of the resolution, 1 46 and in this sense arbitration is not really
private ordering by the parties. However, because arbitration in-
volves removal of the matter from state control, and placement of the
matter in the hands of a non-state actor, we discuss arbitration ap-
propriately within this work.
V. FAMILY LAW CONTRACTING PERMANENCE
Modifications of Final Judgments in Family Law
Prenuptial, postnuptial, separation and settlement agreements
incorporated into final judgments are not necessarily final, because
the judgments themselves are not necessarily final with regard to all
issues-presenting somewhat of a U.S. civil procedure aberration in
apparent violation of the principle of finality of judgments. Specifi-
cally, a court may modify its judgment on issues of alimony, child
support, and child custody.
Generally, a party seeking to modify a final judgment regarding
one or more of these issues must first prove a material change in cir-
cumstances in order to maintain the modification action, in the first
instance, and then prove the underlying standards supporting her
claim, i.e. best interests of the child for child custody. There usually
are some restrictions on the ability of a party to seek modification, for
example, a time moratorium (e.g. two years) on custody modification
actions to promote stability for children, and preclusions against
modification of alimony duration.
145. Lande, supra note 115, at 442-43 (noting the prevalence of "private judges,"
usually retired judges statutorily authorized to decide family law disputes. Often
these private judges are called "special masters" or "referees." Unlike general arbitra-
tors, these private judges are bound by consideration of the law, and their decisions
are generally appealable); see also George K. Walker, Arbitrating Family Law Cases
by Agreement, 18 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 429, 431 n.8 (2003); John W. Whit-
tlesey, Note, Private Judges, Public Juries: The Ohio Legislature Should Rewrite R.C.
§ 2701.10 to Explicitly Authorize Private Judges to Conduct Jury Trials, 58 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 543, 543-46 (2008).
146. Id.
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